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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of corporate governance (focused on 
some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership and chief executive officer duality) in the financial and sports 
performance of the main football clubs in the European Union since 2009 to 2014. 
Football is considered nowadays by many the most popular sport worldwide, and 
running a football club is the same as running a normal company. It is then fundamental 
to study the corporate governance mechanisms applied to this industry as they were to 
all other industries. Some studies have been made on the corporate governance and the 
main conclusions are that higher managerial and institutional ownership, enlarged board 
size and independence and the separation of the CEO and chairman roles conduct to 
higher levels of financial performance. These studies were made on a firm level. Some 
analysis focused on clubs’ profitability and viability reached the conclusion that those 
indicators also have an impact for the clubs that have insolvency problems and low 
financial performance. The results of this study aim not only to measure the impact of 
the corporate governance mechanisms on the financial performance but also on the 
sports performance. The main objective of football clubs is to achieve good sports 
results that consequently will also lead to better financial performances or vice versa. 
Furthermore, it is inseparable that to foster better sports results clubs must have good 
financial performances. Based on the data obtained and on the goal of the study some 
econometric models are created to measure the correlations between the variables in 
focus.  
 
Key-words: Football Clubs, Corporate Governance, Financial Performance, Sports 
Performance 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate governance has evolved as a crucial issue not only for an enterprise’s 
function and control, but also for providing a degree of confidence for the proper 
functioning of the market economy (OECD, 2004). 
Shailer (2004) referred corporate governance as the mechanisms, processes and 
relations by which corporations are controlled and directed.  
According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) the Governance 
structures identify the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the corporation (such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders, 
creditors, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders) and include the rules and 
procedures for making decisions in corporate affairs. Corporate governance includes the 
processes through which corporations' objectives are set and pursued in the context of 
the social, regulatory and market environment. Governance mechanisms include 
monitoring the actions, policies and decisions of corporations and their agents. Those 
practices are affected by attempts to align the interests of stakeholders with the 
company interests.  
Nowadays, the football industry moves millions of euros and has a great impact both in 
the economic and social world. A better understand how the Corporate Governance 
influences the financial and sport performance of the clubs is so of huge importance.  
Initially a good Corporate Governance, a good financial performance and a good sports 
performance will be defined. Then using a sample of the biggest listed clubs from the 
six more important European Leagues will be used considered as the sample of the 
study. The used of listed clubs is crucial, otherwise the information needed, namely 
information about their corporate governance structure be difficult to retrieve.  
 
This study will be structured as follows. After this introductory Chapter, the next 
Chapter will present the literature review, followed by a description of the methodology 
in place, including the description of the variables and of the statistics, in the Chapter 3. 
The estimated regressions that tried to establish a relationship between the Corporate 
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Governance mechanisms and the financial and sports performance will be presented in 
Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5 the main conclusions, limitations of the studies and 
open topics for further research will be presented. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Corporate Governance 
 
On this chapter we focus on the relevant definitions related to the topic under analysis 
accordingly to the literature and we present the main theories on the topic purposed in a 
similar study. 
The notion of Agency Theory is indissociable from any Corporate Governance study. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defend that agency problems appear when managers have 
almost total discretional capacity over how to invest and spend investor’s wealth. Since 
investors will choose the projects that maximize their own benefits (Jensen, 1986), they 
protect themselves by choosing the projects that specifically require their skills (Shleifer 
and Visnhy, 1989) and paying themselves millionaire compensations (Murphy, 1998). 
The conflicts with the owners arise when managers own less than 100% of equity the 
agency problem exists. The only way to mitigate and reduce those agency risks is 
through the implementation of good Corporate Governance mechanisms. 
Examples of agency problems are the “free-rider problem”, the “horizon problem”, the 
“employee theft” and the “empire-building” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The first one 
appears when one agent has incentive to avoid work once its individual effort is not 
directly observable. The second one consists on the fact that agents that expect to leave 
the firm in near future, their preponderance on long-term impact is much lower. The 
employee theft means that employees use firm resources on their own benefit. The 
empire-building problem consists on managers trying to manage a wide number of 
agents to increase their compensation or security (Hart, 1995). 
However, the main and most difficult agency problems to mitigate are the Adverse 
Selection and the Moral Hazard (Berndt and Gupta, 2009). When an agent, prior to the 
establishment of the contract, has better private information than the principals we are 
facing the Adverse Selection problem. After establishment of the contract, agents have 
incentive to deviate once the principal is not able to observe deviations immediately. 
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Accordingly to the Agency Theory it is impossible to avoid the agency problems, the 
unique chance is to minimize them by contractual, monitoring, alignment of interests 
and market solutions (Ross, 1973). 
The first economic approach to the agency risk was given by Adam Smith (1776) who 
claimed that it is not feasible to expect for a manager to manage the money of someone 
as he would manage his own money. Although at that point in time the companies’ size 
was considerably small, and so, the agency costs between the shareholders and the 
managers was not a relevant problem. With the growth of the companies over the years 
increase the demand for qualified management. It started to become evident the 
separation between ownership and management. Amongst with the companies’ growth 
there was a need for further capital investment that lead to the rise of the shareholders 
number, representing a decrease of each one individual influence. Fama & Jensen 
(1983) stated the importance of agency risks claiming that with this capital dilution, 
companies benefit from selecting an expert and adequate manager. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theory of agency initiating the Corporate 
Governance studies. This theory claims that the separation of the ownership from the 
management may conduct managers to perform actions based on their interests. The 
authors claim that the agency problems exist, and so, the agency risks also exist each 
time there is a contract between an agent, called the principal, that empowers other 
agent to manage part of his capital on his behalf. Considering that both individuals are 
rational, they want to maximize their utility and value, the manager, with the objective 
of maximizing is own utility and value can take actions with prejudice to the owner. 
The authors considered in their study that the development of an efficient contract 
between shareholders and managers is very difficult to achieve. Consequently, conflicts 
may rise between managers and stakeholders leading to discrepancies and inefficiencies 
that decrease the value of a firm. Accordingly to the authors, with Corporate 
Governance strategies, shareholders are able to control the managers’ performance 
reducing the probabilities of inappropriate behaviour and actions. If all the variables 
remain constant, with higher monitoring of the directors’ actions the agency problems 
should reduce and so increase the company performance. The authors claim that it is 
fundamental to monitor the behaviour of the managers and to protect the interests of all 
stakeholders. 
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2.2. The Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
Mathiesen (2002) defined Corporate Governance as a field that investigates how to 
secure and motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of incentive 
mechanisms like contracts, organizational designs and legislation. However, the main 
concern relies on the financial performance increase by those mechanisms. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) claimed that Corporate Governance handles how the suppliers of finance 
guarantee the return of their investment. In a more detailed perspective, Monks and 
Minow (2008) defined Corporate Governance as the structure that pretends to make 
sure that the proper questions are took in place and that checks and balances are in place 
to verify if the answers reflect what is best for the creation of long-term, sustainable 
value. Governance is fundamental since all the parties involved are not trustful to do 
what is better for the organization permanently. 
It is still important to access if implementing Corporate Governance mechanisms really 
matters to the firm value. McKinsey (2002) placed a survey of institutional investors 
and concluded that good governance is an important factor affecting stock selection. 
Furthermore, a team from Harvard found that buying well-governed firms and selling 
poorly governed ones yielded excess returns of 8.5%.  
A key aspect of the Corporate Governance mechanisms to be implemented is the 
cultural issues. It is fundamental to observe and analyze the cultural environment of the 
firm since it is necessary to adopt different mechanisms accordingly to the environment 
(Li and Harrison, 2008). 
In an international perspective the legal framework defines the nature of the governance 
problem; however the legal rules vary across countries. This country-level variation in 
the governance problem leads to country-level variation in the governance solutions (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). The quality of legal protection for 
investors differs across different countries due to the law and the enforcement. When a 
country has weak legal protection the ownership tends to become highly concentrated, 
which implies on the importation of the corporate governance solutions. 
There are several Corporate Governance mechanisms, which can be either internal or 
external (Weir, Laind and McKnight, 2002). 
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2.2.1. Internal Mechanisms 
 
The ownership structure may create incentives for investor to monitor the managers. 
However, its efficiency it is not consensual among financial literature. Morck (1988) 
claims that the low concentration (up to 5%) increases firm value due to the 
convergence of interests. The same author however claims that a higher percentage 
leads to entrenchment and more opportunistic behavior. Jensen (1983) defended that 
split ownership can create different level of agency problems. On the other hand this 
mechanism helps to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests since it reduces the 
incentives for managers to extract rents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In terms of 
ownership mechanisms and cultural issues there are several Corporate Governance 
mechanisms accordingly to the country and culture (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) that can 
be analysed per region.  
2.2.1.1. The Corporate Governance Models 
 
There are different corporate governance models that are normally implemented in 
different regions in the world. The American model supports the temporary interest of 
the shareholders in the company, the distance between the CEO and the investors, the 
active role of the market in the corporate control and the prevail of the investors 
interests over other stakeholders (Djelic, 1998 and Orru, 1997). The Asian models have 
usually a bank has the parent company that manages and provides liquidity. The banks 
are also allowed to have significant parts of the company, being self-governing. There 
are strong barriers to organizational changes and a strong lack of transparency. This 
model reduces agency conflicts and gathers easier funding but raises the question of the 
conflicts of interests and the inefficiency allocation of resources. Then we have the 
Continental model, used primarily in continental Europe and accordingly to Barca and 
Becht (2001) gives priority to the shareholders – they control the company – the 
families and founders usually are the main shareholders, the relationship between the 
CEO’s and the shareholders is stable, the institutional investors are very important in 
the companies’ structure, the shareholders have a longstanding interest in the company, 
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the market is considered as inefficient for control, the banks have a strong role and the 
employers strong rights. 
Another internal corporate governance mechanism is the Board of Directors. There are 
two basic board models, the one-tier and the two-tier boards (Tan, 2011). The first ones 
are related with market-based system and they primary responsibility is to monitor the 
management in behalf of the owners, focusing on the overall panorama and not the daily 
business decisions and is implement mainly in United Kingdom and United States of 
America. On the other hand, we have the two-tier boards that are associated with bank-
centered systems like Germany and Japan and have two separated government bodies – 
the supervisory and the management board. The first system has less bureaucracy and 
faster decision making while the second one has a clearer delineation of duties and 
greater independence.  
One of the main aspects studied in the Corporate Governance field regarding the Board 
of Directors is the board size. Boone et al. (2007) defend that the existence of small and 
medium boards promotes innovation. Jensen (1983) claims that a board can be 
considered small when it has 8 members, while Lipton and Lorsch (1992) defend that it 
is up to 10 members. Black et al. (2006) figured the number has up to 8 members. 
Furthermore, smaller boards tend to replace the CEO more efficiently. Yermack (1996) 
concluded for a negative relationship between Board Size and companies’ value. Once 
the monitors have increasing importance on the boards also the outsiders are becoming 
more important (Rosenstein and Wyat, 1990). The authors defended that some problems 
that can arise from these mechanisms is the fact that the independent members may not 
be really independent, some directors can be serving the board for too long, the board 
size can easily escalate to inefficient numbers, the directors can lack expertise and can 
have residual interest in the company, and it is usual that the CEO is also the Chairman. 
The auditor also has an important role on the Corporate Governance mechanisms 
(Mitra, 2012). These mechanisms have been evolving in order to be adjusted both the 
social and market needs. The role of the auditor is normally represented by an audit 
committee that should include non-executive directors by majority, approve the 
appointment of the auditors, establish the audit fees, approve all non-audit services 
provided and review earnings releases and management’s presentations to analysts (Xie, 
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Davidson and DaDalt, 2003). All the members of this committee should have a financial 
background and should be qualified professionals. 
2.2.2. External Mechanisms 
 
The main external mechanism used is the threat of takeover (Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
When a firm is poorly managed it becomes an easy target for a hostile takeover, since 
markets its price should drop a lot if markets are efficient. As stronger and more 
efficient the capital markets are more efficient the takeover threat act as a protection 
mechanism. 
The importance of the Corporate Governance mechanisms became more evident with 
further studies on the field made by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Yermack (1996), 
Brown & Caylor (2009) Kaserer & Moldenhauer (2008), Rose (2007), Lehmann, 
Warning, & Weigang (2004), Elsayed (2007). Shleifer and Vishny defend that those 
mechanisms, fundamentally the board of directors, are considered important to protect 
the interests of creditors and investors, and also protecting the firm value and viability. 
All other studies provide evidence that the financial performance is higher in companies 
that have implemented real corporate governance mechanisms. Despite the 
implementation of all those mechanisms, their efficiency was questioned by the 
occurrence of some public scandals like ENRON and Parmalat. Cadbury (1992) defined 
the importance of the development of the British companies to the success of the British 
economy and consequently, the World’s economy. He developed the now famous 
Cadbury Report (1992)
1, where it is suggested that the companies’ board members 
should be free to allow them to grow, but in a responsible and transparent way, a good 
Corporate Governance system. Many empirical studies have considered the board size 
and its impact on the firm financial performance. Both Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wefls (1998), and Jensen (1993) claimed that reduced boards relate with 
higher market valuation and profitability considering that the advantages of increased 
                                                          
1
 Also entitled Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, was issued in 1992 by “The Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance” with Adrian Cadbury as chairman. The report aims to set 
recommendations regarding the accounting metrics and company boards trying to mitigate risks of failure 
in the Corporate Governance. It is the base to several other codes both in European Union and United 
States. 
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control may be overcome by prejudicial management decisions. Fitsenberg and Malkiel 
(1994) also defend the idea that shorter boards allow an easier consensus amongst the 
board member and conduct to a more reliable communication, thus best decisions are 
made and so improved financial performance. This theory gained power due to the 
verifications performed by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) and Boone, Field, 
Karpoff, and Raheja (2007). On the other hand, larger boards allow a greater pool of 
expertise, greater management control and better accesses to contracts and resources 
(Cheng, 2008). Forbes, and Milliken (1999), Yawson (2006), and Pye (2000) defend 
that the larger boards lead to increasing agency problems, given the difficulty to 
coordinate its members and to reduce the obstacles in the strategic decisions process. 
2.3. The impact of Corporate Governance in the firms 
 
It was during the 21st century that several papers regarding the topic of Corporate 
Governance appeared. Some examples are the Cadbury Report (1992), Vienot I (1995)
2
, 
Vienot II (1999)
3
 and Cromme (2002)
4
 which represent the recent influence of the 
Corporate Governance in the firms. Furthermore the study on this topic was expanded 
beyond the shareholders-managers relationship since that on the present days all the 
stakeholders are considered in the Corporate Governance mechanisms. All the agents 
that have influence in a normal basis of a company are considered, since the creditors, 
suppliers, government, banks, regulators, clients, sponsors and in an extreme point the 
society in general. This new trend is more evident in Europe as in the United States of 
America the capital markets perspective drive the Corporate Governance mechanisms. 
In fact, the Corporate Governance in the USA plays a role so fundamental that it is the 
only country that has it legislated through the Sabarnes-Oxlet Act (2002)
5
. The risk 
                                                          
2
 The Vienot I report was published in 1995 following the need for transparency by the managers of listed 
companies and the increasing weight of foreign minority shareholders. Having as basis the Cadbury 
Report, it is a list of recommendations that facilitates the integration of the Corporate Governance 
principles into the French Boards of Directors. 
3
 Published in 1999, is a report with the recommendations of the committee on Corporate Governance 
chaired by Marc Vienot. It focus on two issues, the separation of the Chief Executive Officer and the 
Chairman roles and the Disclosure of the compensation granted to corporate offices of listed companies. 
4
 Cromme is also known as the German Code of Corporate Governance and it was created to stablish a set 
of rules and recommendations on the Corporate Governance topic for the German listed companies. 
5
 A United States of America federal law that establishes a group of new or expanded requirements for all 
the American public companies boards, managements and accounting, impacting also private companies. 
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management, sustainability and the social responsibility of the companies are now taken 
into consideration by the Corporate Governance mechanisms. It is a great evolution 
from the classic studies in the Finance field that only took into consideration the 
financial performance. 
The deregulation of the capital markets, the improving international mobility and their 
intensive growth, the multinational companies’ globalization and the growth of the 
financial assets in the wealth of the people demands for a continuous evolution and 
improvement of the Corporate Governance. 
2.4. The Corporate Governance of football clubs 
 
Dimitropoulos (2012) studied the Corporate Governance mechanisms effects in football 
clubs concluding for a positive correlation between them and the financial performance 
and viability. They measured the efficiency of the Corporate Governance mechanisms 
by the size of the board of directors, the level of board independence, the level of 
ownership on the managers’ side, the existence of institutional investors, and a negative 
correlation of the financial performance and viability with the role of the CEO as the 
chairman of the board. In the football industry there are few studies on the corporate 
governance topic, nevertheless, Naftemporiki (2010) concluded that the mean size of 
the board of directors in the industry is between seven and ten members. Dimitropoulos 
(2011) studied the impact of the board size in the clubs financial performance and 
concluded that the football clubs with smaller board size report financial statement with 
higher quality. 
Accordingly, the issue of efficient corporate governance in sport organizations was 
initially raised in 1997 by the Australian Standing Committee on Recreation and Sport. 
Similar reports were published in the UK and New Zealand and by respective 
federations and research centres and also by the International Olympic Committee. On 
that direction, Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2004) and Standards Australia 
(2003) have published a set of governance principles for sport organizations which 
among others declare that sport organizations must be accountable to shareholders and 
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stakeholders and provide transparent and reliable information to all interested parties, 
internal and external. 
Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos (2012) analysed the impact of corporate governance in 
the football clubs. They used a sample of 67 clubs, where the majority where non-listed 
clubs. They used as dependent variables accounting indicators like the Returns on 
Assets and the Solvency ratio (our study will focus only on listed clubs, allowing the 
use also of market indicators). 
The authors concluded that the European football clubs are owned in 47.4% by insiders 
(managers and officers) and 48.9% from institutional investors. It was also found that 
the majority of the Boards are composed by nine members were 46.6% of them are 
independent. However, the CEO duality is not accomplished, the clubs are small sized, 
highly leveraged and only 11.6% of them are listed. 
The results obtained shown that the ROA – returns on assets - and SR  - solvency ratio - 
are positively correlated, that ROA is positively correlated with board size and 
negatively with the CEO Duality, suggesting that football clubs with increased board 
size and those where the roles of CEO and board chairman are separated achieve greater 
levels of profitability. 
Profitability is positively correlated to firm size and negatively to leverage as the 
viability of the clubs is positively correlated both with board size and board 
independence, this means that independent directors can perform a more efficient 
control on managers decisions.  
The variables managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board size and board 
independency are both positive and significant as expected.  
The CEO duality variable is negative and significant which indicates that the clubs that 
do not have the CEO duality have a worst financial performance. 
The authors also found that listed football clubs are related with higher values of the 
solvency ratio, therefore, presenting small probability of default relative to their unlisted 
counterparts. Additionally, listed football clubs are characterized by higher board size 
and board independence compared to unlisted ones. 
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The study by Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos (2012) will be the base of our work. 
However, since our sample only includes listed clubs, we will allow also use market 
indicators as dependent variables of our models. Furthermore, as we aim to measure the 
impact of the corporate governance not only on financial performance but also on sports 
performance. 
2.5.  The measure of financial performance 
 
Currently earnings-per-share (EPS) is known has the single most popular and widely 
used financial performance indicator. Graham et al. (2001) shown, in their survey to 
400 financial United States executives, that the great majority consider that earnings 
were the most important measure to report to third parties. Furthermore, EPS is also 
considered as the basis to strategic decision-making such as share valuations, 
management performance incentive remunerations and mergers and acquisitions 
negotiations. It is a simple calculated indicator and easy to understand that leads the 
managers decisions since they are congratulated each time there is a positive EPS 
growth. Taking this into consideration, it is not odd to find that managers have a special 
concern on EPS when it is linked to their compensation. 
Atkins et al. (2010) consider that the great motivation regarding the EPS is the fact that 
EPS summarises the earnings generated for shareholders and the shareholder’s views 
appeal to investors and management alike. Brown (1999) argues that when companies 
face severe pressure to meet the expectations of the markets, the underperformance of 
EPS compared to the estimates has a several impact in share prices. Furthermore, the 
share prices face a big movement as a response to earnings surprises. This reinforces the 
perception that short-term earnings drive share price changes instead of long-term cash-
flow expectations. 
Despite being one of the most popular indicators it is also one of the most contested 
ones. This is visible in the three major limitations: the inability to reflect shareholder 
wealth creation, the EPS management and an inherent bias towards positive EPS 
growth. 
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Nevertheless, even with the limitations we consider that due to the major use of the 
indicator it will be used in our study has the indicator of financial performance. 
The main objective of our study is to find the relation between the Corporate 
Governance and the financial and sports performance of the football clubs. We intend to 
measure if the implementation of good Corporate Governance in the football clubs has 
impact on the financial performance of them.  
Furthermore, given the social impact of football clubs we intend to analyse if the sports 
performance has also any impact in the financial performance, taking as premise the 
fact that if a club has a good sports performance it will have more benefits and more 
supporters, which consecutively, should lead to better financial results. 
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3. Methodology, Data Collection and Descriptive analysis 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to study the relation between the Corporate 
Governance and the financial and sports performance of the football clubs. Taking into 
consideration the impact of football in the financial, economic and social world, football 
clubs should be governed as a regular firm and so it is of huge importance to understand 
led to a better sport performance because in the end it’s the decisive factor regarding the 
survival of not of a professional football club. Additionally, this study will try also to 
understand if as expected the sport performance has also any impact in the financial 
performance. A good sports performance will eventually led to more supporters, which 
consecutively, should led to better financial results. 
Following the lights of the European Transparency Directive (2013), the public listed 
companies face the obligation of providing transparent information to the general 
public, both the community and the investor. Furthermore, the legislation stablishes that 
the companies have to publish all the information that can impact the market. Moreover, 
the Directive obligates the companies to publish quarterly financial reports and interim 
management statements. 
Given the above mentioned disclosure, with the aim of obtaining the most credible and 
reliable data, all the information was obtained from the published Financial and 
Corporate Governance Reports, databases and other sources for a sample of European 
listed football clubs on diverse European markets. Some information was also retrieved 
from the Bloomberg
6
 platform, namely for the clubs that only publish the annual reports 
in their domestic language. The financial ratios were retrieved from Datastream, 
Amadeus and the annual reports, while the sport performance indicators were collected 
from zerozero
7
, a huge Internet database that contains football results for all European 
competitions for the last decades. The period of analysis includes the seasons between 
2011/2012 and 2013/2014 (inclusively). 
                                                          
6
 http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
7
 http://www.zerozero.pt/ 
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Our sample of 21 European listed clubs, shown in Table 1, includes all listed clubs that 
have participated in the first division of their national league and in the major 
international European leagues. 
 
Table 1 - Description of the sample 
Club Country 
AALBORG BOLDSPILKLUB Denmark 
AFC AJAX Netherlands 
AS ROMA Italy 
BESIKTAS Turkey 
BORUSSIA DORTMUND Germany 
BRONDBY IF B Denmark 
CELTIC Scotland 
FENERBAHCE SPORTIF HIZMET Turkey 
FUTEBOL CLUBE DO PORTO Portugal 
GALATASARAY Turkey 
JUVENTUS Italy 
LAZIO Italy 
OLYMPIQUE LYONNAIS France 
PARKEN SPORT & ENTERTAINMENT Denmark 
RUCH CHORZOW Poland 
SILKEBORG Denmark 
SPORT LISBOA E BENFICA Portugal 
SPORTING Portugal 
TRABZONSPOR SPORTIF YATIR Turkey 
ARSENAL FC England 
MANCHESTER UNITED England 
3.1. Independent Variables 
 
With the objective of observing the impact of Corporate Governance mechanisms in the 
European football clubs will we follow the main study developed until today regarding  
the financial performance of football clubs (Dimitropoulos, 2012). Although, 
additionally to the financial performance our study will also analyses the impact of 
Corporate Governance mechanism in the sport performance. 
So, using a panel data analysis we estimated the following model: 
16 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑐 + 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡) + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) +
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑢(𝑡)                                                              (1) 
Equation 1 – The impact of the Corporate Governance mechanisms in the financial performance 
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑐 + 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡) + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) +
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑢(𝑡)                                                             (2) 
Equation 2 - The impact of the Corporate Governance mechanisms in the sports performance 
 
The exogenous (independent) variable “BSIZE” is the absolute number of directors that 
belongs to the board. Naftemporiki (2010) studied the board size on the football 
industry and concluded that the average board size is between 7 and 10. Boone et al. 
(2007) defended that the maintenance of small and medium boards enhances 
innovation. It is visible through all the reviewed literature that if the boards are very 
large there is a negative impact in the firms’ value. Accordingly to Dimitropoulos 
(2012), evidence shows that listed clubs tend to have larger boards than unlisted clubs. 
“BINDEP” represents the percentage of independent directors present in the board as it 
is a proxy for the board independence (Rosenstein and Wyat, 1990). The authors found 
evidence that the presence of independent directors is done on behalf of shareholders 
interest. However, the conclusion that the increasing number of independent directors 
enhances the firm value was not reached.  
“INSTOWN” represents the percentage of shares owned by institutional companies and 
the variable “MANOWN” represents the percentage of shares detained by the 
managers. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) defended that the ownership is highly influenced 
by the geographical region. Jensen (1983) defended that split ownership can create 
different level of agency problems. Morck (1988) defended that the low concentration 
of the ownership increases firm value due to the convergence of interests amongst the 
owners. Despite Dimitropoulos (2012) found a positive impact of the ownership 
variables in the model, considering the literature reviewed we expect a negative impact.  
The last independent variable is “CEODUAL” and is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the the club has a different chairman from the CEO and 0 otherwise. 
Rosenstein and Wyat (1990) defended that having the same individual sharing the 
position of CEO and Chairman can lead to lack of expertise and residual interest on the 
company which may not fulfil the shareholders expectations. . 
17 
 
A correlation matrix of all variables is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Correlation matrix 
 BINDEP BSIZE CEODUAL EPS INSTOWN MANOWN SPORTS 
BINDEP 1.00 0.58 0.01 -0.10 -0.16 -0.07 -0.20 
BSIZE 0.58 1.00 -0.25 0.35 -0.11 0.13 -0.18 
CEODUAL 0.01 -0.25 1.00 0.11 -0.06 -0.27 0.22 
EPS -0.10 0.35 0.11 1.00 -0.23 0.08 0.18 
INSTOWN -0.16 -0.11 -0.06 -0.23 1.00 -0.50 -0.13 
MANOWN -0.07 0.13 -0.27 0.08 -0.50 1.00 -0.07 
SPORTS -0.20 -0.18 0.22 0.18 -0.13 -0.07 1.00 
 
From the analysis of the matrix we are able to observe that, as expected, there is high 
correlation between the board independence and the board size variables. Also, between 
the managerial ownership and the institutional ownership variables high correlation is 
visible. 
3.2.  Dependent Variables 
 
As proxy for the financial performance the “EPS” variable was used. Graham et al. 
(2001) performed a survey amongst 400 American financial executives and concluded 
that the vast majority consider the earnings-per-share as the most important indicator to 
report on. Atkins et al. (2010) found evidence that the EPS reflects the earnings 
generated for the shareholders and is key both for investors and managers. Furthermore, 
Brown (1999) argued that when a company is pressured to meet the market expectations 
and is not able to present and EPS similar to the one expected, the price of the shares is 
seriously impacted. The author also found that share prices are impacted as a response 
to earnings surprises.  
As proxy for the sport performance we developed our own measure based on the club 
coefficient rankings publish by UEFA every year. UEFA is the entity responsible for 
the organization of the two major football competitions in Europe and the rankings are 
based on the sports results of clubs competing in the five previous seasons of the 
competitions organized by UEFA. The ranking is calculated has the sum of all points 
won in the previous five years, plus 20% of the association coefficient over the same 
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period. The points won by the clubs and attributed by UEFA are calculated as presented 
in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3 - UEFA Champions League points system 
UEFA Champions League 
points system  
Points 
First qualifying round 
elimination  0.5 
Second qualifying round 
elimination  1 
Group stage participation 5 
Group stage win  2 
Group stage draw  1 
Round of 16 participation  4 
Since 2009/10 clubs have been 
awarded an additional point if they 
reach the round of 16, quarter-finals, 
semi-finals or final. 
 
 
Table 4 - UEFA Europa League points system 
UEFA Europa League points system  Points 
First qualifying round elimination  
0.25 
Second qualifying round elimination  
0.5 
Third qualifying round elimination 1 
Play-off elimination 1.5 
Group stage win 2 
Group stage draw 1 
Since 2009/10, clubs have been guaranteed a 
minimum of two points if they reach the group 
stage and are awarded an additional point if they 
get to the quarter-finals, semi-finals or final. 
 
In order to include the national competitions also we have created a system point 
according to the Table 5. The sport performance measure is a weighted indicator of the 
similar competitions that the clubs enrol during the season. Given the characteristics of 
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the indicator we assume that if a club has a 0 indicator the sport performance is bad. 
From 0 to 10 in a specific season indicates the season was reasonable. From 11 to 29 the 
season is considered a good season and higher than 30 the season is considered 
excellent. 
Table 5 - Sport performance indicator 
Competition Phase Points 
Champions League 
1/8 2 
¼ 2 
Semi-
Final 
3 
Final 4 
Winner 8 
National League 
3rd place 5 
2nd place 15 
Winner 30 
National Cup 
Final 4 
Winner 7 
Super Cup Winner 3 
Europa League 
1/16 1 
1/8 1 
¼ 2 
Semi-
Final 
3 
Final 4 
Winner 6 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the model variables are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6 - Variables statistics 
 
Mean Median Max Min 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Board Size 
(number) 
7.81 7 15 4 3.13 84 
Board Independence (n. Of 
independent directors 
0.35 0.38 0.75 - 0.19 84 
Managerial Ownership 
(percentage) 
42% 53% 89% 0% 32% 72 
Institutional Ownership 
(percentage) 
14.73% 7.24% 78.04% 0% 18.91% 84 
CEO Duality 
(Y or N) 
0.90 1 1 - 0.29 84 
EPS 1.21 - 20.62 - 3.89 80 
Sports 15.31 10 46 - 14.05 84 
 
We can observe that typically the Board of Directors of the listed clubs in Europe is 
composed by an average of 8 board members, of which 35% (approximately 3) of them 
are independent.  
The maximum number of directors making a board is 15 and the maximum percentage 
of independent directors in a board is 75%. 
On the other hand the percentage of ownership detained by the managers is of 42%
8
.  
The institutional investors have on average 15% of the shares, but the highest value 
observed is of 78%. In some clubs those type of investors are not represented in their 
ownership structure. 
It is also noticeable that the great majority of the clubs (90%) under analysis have a 
separation between the CEO and the Chairman. 
The clubs in our sample present in average the earnings-per-share equal to 1.21 euro. 
The highest value observed is 20.62 euro. 
Finally from the analysis of the sports performance indicator we can conclude that on 
average the analysed clubs have good seasons, with some clubs obtaining the excellent 
classification on a specific season. 
  
                                                          
8
 This variable does not include Trabzonspor as the club does not share that information publicly. 
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4. Regression Analysis 
The objective of this section is to study the factors that might have influence in the 
European football clubs financial and sports performance.   
The Corporate Governance variables will be introduced to measure if they impact the 
clubs financial and sports performance and finally we will analyse both the impact of 
that mechanisms and of the sports performance in the clubs financial performance. 
4.1. The impact of Corporate Governance mechanisms on the 
financial performance 
As suggested in the literature the adoption of good Corporate Governance mechanisms 
enhances the clubs’ financial performance. The aim of this regression is to measure the 
impact of the already discussed mechanisms in the analysed clubs financial 
performance. Given the analysed correlation between the variables the model will be 
estimated with different variables at the time in order to obtain the most accurate results. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑐 + 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡) + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) +
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑢(𝑡)                                                              (1) 
Equation 3 – The impact of the Corporate Governance mechanisms in the financial performance 
Where, 
EPS, represents the indicator of financial performance; 
BINDEP, the percentage of the independence members of the board of directors; 
BSIZE, the board size; 
MANOWN, the level of managerial ownership; 
INSTOWN, the level of institutional investor ownership; 
CEODUAL is a dummy variable that represents the existence (or not) of duality 
between the chairman and the CEO. 
The results of the regression are shown in table 7. 
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Table 7 - Financial performance output 
Variables I II III IV V 
Constant -3.11 -4.127 2.58 -6.268*** -1.757 
BINDEP -11.835* 
 
-2.898 -10.358* -4.966** 
BSIZE 1.043*** 0.531*** 
 
1.018*** 0.439*** 
INSTOWN -6.442*** -3.88698 -5.673* 
 
-3.426546 
MANOWN -1.970773 -0.21473 -0.63075 0.32406 
 CEODUAL 3.077** 2.438338 1.027018 3.91* 1.989244 
Adj. R-squared 0.353*** 0.147*** 0.03 0.295*** 0.124*** 
Observations 76 76 76 76 80 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1 
     
From the analysis of the output we observe that the model is globally significant. 
However, we can conclude that the variable MANOWN is not statistically significant 
individually. Previously, we have noticed that MANOWN is correlated with variable 
INSTOWN, and also that when we estimate the models with each variable at the time 
the signal is impacted (Model I and IV). Given this, and considering that the adjusted R-
squared is highly impacted in Model V, we will rely on model IV to our study. 
The variable BINDEP, shows a negative value, meaning that an increase of one board 
member has a negative impact in the financial performance of the clubs. On the other 
hand, when the board size increases one unit the EPS always increases relatively. 
The CEO Duality has a positive impact on the financial performance of the clubs.  
Furthermore, from observing the constant we can conclude that if all the independent 
variables are set to 0 the financial performance would be negative. This also leads us to 
the conclusion that without proper Corporate Governance mechanisms the clubs would 
have negative financial performances. 
In summary, variables BSIZE, MANOWN and CEODUAL are positively correlated 
with the clubs financial performance. On the other hand, the variable representative of 
the board independence is negatively correlated with our exogenous indicator.  
These findings in Model IV met the conclusions from Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos 
(2012). 
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4.2. The impact of Corporate Governance mechanisms on the 
sports performance 
As stated in the previous sections we intend to measure if the use of good Corporate 
Governance mechanisms enhances the clubs sports performance. The aim of this 
regression is to test the influence of the mechanisms under analysis in the clubs sports 
performance. Given the analysed correlation between the variables the model will be 
estimated with different variables at the time in order to obtain the most accurate results. 
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑐 + 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸(𝑡) + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁(𝑡) +
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑢(𝑡)                                                             (2) 
Equation 4 - The impact of the Corporate Governance mechanisms in the sports performance 
Where, 
SPORTS, represents the measure of sport performance; 
And all the other variables the same meaning as in the previous equation. 
The output of the regression is shown in table 8. 
Table 8 - Sport performance output 
Variables VI VII VIII 
Constant 23.794* 24.579*** 32.283*** 
BINDEP -21.211** 
 
-20.458** 
BSIZE 0.136264 -20.071** 
 INSTOWN -19.04* -18.954* -21.901** 
MANOWN -10.027* -9.893* -12.214** 
CEODUAL 6.958034 6.671773   
Adj. R-squared 0.0859** 0.098** 0.091** 
Observations 80 80 80 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1 
  
From the observation of the values we conclude that the model is statistically significant 
for a confidence level of 95%. Taking into consideration the autocorrelation between 
the variables (presented before in the correlation matrix), we estimated the model again 
with each variable at the time.  
All the variables have a negative impact on the sports performance.  Which means that 
an increase in one of the variables impact the performance of the clubs negatively. 
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However, it is noticeable that the constant has a high coefficient. This can be caused by 
the small number of independent variables, which means that other variables can be the 
factors that influence the sports performance of football clubs.  
We conclude that the Corporate Governance mechanisms have impact on the sports 
performance but are not the only explanatory factor. For a future study we leave open 
the analysis of the impact of wages, assets and budget on the sports performance.  
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5. Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of the Corporate Governance 
mechanisms in the financial and sports performance of the European football clubs. Our 
sample included 21 listed clubs participating in European football leagues, over the 
period 2010-2014. 
The literature showed that the implementation of efficient mechanisms such a large 
board size and its independence as well as the separation between the CEO and 
chairman roles were a major contributor to good financial performance. In our sample 
the ownership by managers and institutions seems to negatively impact the financial 
performance of the clubs. Managers need to understand the importance of implementing 
good Corporate Governance mechanisms not only to allow the participation of all the 
clubs stakeholders, but also to be able to show to the market that the clubs are trustful 
and from there, be able to obtain other sources of financing. The protection of the 
shareholders and stakeholders interests should be one of the main objectives of the 
clubs, since preventing the managers’ expropriation of wealth and maximizing the 
clubs’ economic results and social return, will ultimately lead to better financial and 
sport performance.  
Nevertheless, from what we have analysed, the Corporate Governance mechanisms 
seem to not have a direct impact in the clubs sports performance. This variable should 
be impacted more by clubs’ budget, assets and wages, since those seem to have a direct 
influence, even if they are decided by the Board of Directors. We have found evidence 
that the Corporate Governance mechanisms studied have impact on the clubs financial 
performance, indicating , also that the clubs should have proper mechanisms 
implemented in order to achieve better financial indicators and be more attractive to the 
market and consequently to investors. 
The European football clubs do not seem to focus on the financial markets, explained by 
the concentrated ownership, which can be sign that better regulations regarding the 
Corporate Governance mechanisms are needed and UEFA should restructure the 
regulatory requirements together with the exchange stocks regulators. 
Finally, there are some limitations to our study that need to be highlighted. Firstly, the 
usage of the EPS as the financial indicator, despite being one of the most common and 
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used financial indicator, its use is contested by several authors. Also, our study is 
limited to Europe and to a unique sport, as so, we leave the door open for future studies 
of covering these topics. Furthermore, with a time spawn of 4 years the conclusions can 
be biased, so, for further suggestions, a broader timeline can give more strength to our 
findings. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1- Sample analysis 
For all clubs the value of revenues, total assets, net income and earnings per share were 
obtain in the databases mentioned and the descriptive statistics are shown in this 
appendix. 
All the values are an average of the data retrieved for the four seasons under analysis 
and have been converted from their original currency to euro according the exchange 
rate published by the Portuguese Central Bank
9
. 
Appendix 1 - Sample detailed statistics 
Club Revenues Assets 
Net 
Income 
EPS 
AALBORG BOLDSPILKLUB 16.58 16.09 5.34 0.00 
AFC AJAX 103.80 132.00 16.60 0.00 
AS ROMA 114.60 215.10 -38.60 0.00 
BESIKTAS 66.84 53.88 -42.15 0.00 
BORUSSIA DORTMUND 260.70 292.30 11.70 0.37 
BRONDBY IF B 16.34 25.74 -19.99 0.00 
CELTIC 87.99 131.24 15.23 5.32 
FENERBAHCE SPORTIF HIZMET 95.28 93.36 -54.36 0.36 
FUTEBOL CLUBE DO PORTO 72.00 211.00 -36.00 0.00 
GALATASARAY 104.88 234.42 -26.25 1.04 
JUVENTUS 307.50 495.90 -6.70 0.02 
LAZIO 78.70 174.90 7.10 0.08 
OLYMPIQUE LYONNAIS 104.40 309.50 -26.40 0.00 
PARKEN SPORT & ENTERTAINMENT 146.21 350.52 0.87 1.11 
RUCH CHORZOW 7.41 4.42 -0.59 0.00 
SILKEBORG 7.72 66.59 -0.98 0.02 
SPORT LISBOA E BENFICA 76.00 441.00 14.00 0.11 
SPORTING 29.60 146.80 0.40 0.00 
TRABZONSPOR SPORTIF YATIR 31.26 81.33 -31.20 0.19 
ARSENAL FC 330.48 1135.60 40.80 - 
MANCHESTER UNITED 1007.28 2827.05 55.43 15.67 
 
                                                          
9
 Exchange rate verified on the 1st of September of 2015 on https://www.bportugal.pt/pt-
PT/Estatisticas/Dominios%20Estatisticos/EstatisticasCambiais/Paginas/Taxasdereferenciadiarias.aspx 
35 
 
The largest club in our sample is the Manchester United (United Kingdom), while the 
smallest club is the Ruch Chórzow (Poland). However, Fenerbahce (Turkey) is the club 
with the lowest net income average for the period analysed. Regarding the EPS it is 
visible that the great majority of the clubs present a null result. The club with highest 
value is Manchester United, while the club with lowest value (excluding the null values) 
is Juventus (Italy). 
 
